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Introduction
TherelationshippropertyproceedingsbetweenMrandMrsClayton
have given rise to some controversial decisions about trusts
and the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA). The Fam-
ily Court and the High Court both concluded, for different
reasons, that the main trust, the Vaughan Road Property
Trust, was “illusory”.1 The effect was that the assets in that
trust were treated as beneficially belonging to Mr Clayton
and thus subject to the PRA’s equal sharing regime. The
Court of Appeal overruled the lower courts on this point, but
held that the power to add and remove discretionary benefi-
ciaries that Mr Clayton held in his personal capacity was
property within the meaning of the PRA.2 The power was
classified as relationship property and accorded the same
value as the net value of the trust assets. Not surprisingly,
these decisions have caused consternation, particularly among
trust lawyers.
This paper will begin with a brief discussion of the claims
that Mrs Clayton made against the various trusts under s 44
of the PRA and s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980.
The main focus of this paper is on the Court of Appeal’s
rulings that the Vaughan Road Property Trust was not illu-
sory but that Mr Clayton’s power to add and remove benefi-
ciaries was property.
Facts of Clayton v Clayton
Mr and Mrs Clayton lived in a de facto relationship from
1986 until they married in 1989. They had two daughters,
Stacey and Anna, born in 1990 and 1994 respectively. The
parties separated in 2006 and dissolved their marriage in
2009. When the parties met, Mr Clayton owned a fledgling
timber supply business and three blocks of land on one of
which the parties built their family home. Six weeks before
the parties married, Mr Clayton had a s 21 agreement drawn
up to protect his properties as his separate property, includ-
ing the family home, the family chattels and his business
assets,. In the event of a separation Mrs Clayton would
receive $10,000 for each year of marriage up to a maximum
of $30,000. After receiving independent advice from their
respective solicitors, the parties signed the agreement.
When the parties separated 17 years later, Mr Clayton had
built up significant sawmilling and timber processing inter-
ests, allegedly worth $28 million. Apart from the family
home, which he owned personally, his assets were mostly
held in a complex web of trusts and companies. Central to
the proceedings in this case were four trusts settled during the
marriage:
• the Vaughan Road Property Trust (VRPT), which
owned the land and buildings from which Mr Clayton
operated his businesses;
• the Claymark Trust, which owned land adjoining
the sawmill; and
• an education trust for each of his daughters. After
the parties had separated, Mr Clayton settled four
more trusts, which were also subject to proceedings.
The claims
Mrs Clayton brought relationship property proceedings, chal-
lenging the validity of the s 21 agreement and claiming an
equal share of all the assets held in the trusts and companies.
Mr Clayton conceded that the s 21 agreement had become
unfair in some respects and, accordingly, the Family Court
set it aside under s 21J as seriously unjust.3 That ruling was
upheld on appeal.4
Mrs Clayton then mounted a range of arguments in
respect of the trusts. She argued inter alia that dispositions to
the children’s education trusts and the post-separation trusts
should be set aside under s 44 of the PRA. She claimed that
the Claymark Trust was a nuptial settlement that should be
varied under s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980. In
regard to the VRPT she argued that its assets belonged
beneficially to Mr Clayton, because the trust was a sham or
otherwise invalid.
Property (Relationships) Act, s 44
Mrs Clayton claimed that dispositions made to the two
children’s education trusts and the four post-separation trusts
should be set aside under s 44 of the PRA, because Mr Clayton
had made those dispositions with the intention of defeating
her rights under the Act. Mrs Clayton was successful in
relation to the children’s education trusts and two of the four
post-separation trusts.
To succeed in a claim under s 44 the claimant must show
that a disposition was made to a third party, that the transferor
intended the disposition to defeat the applicant’s rights under
the PRA,5 and that the disposition had that effect.6 Estab-
lishing the requisite intention used to depend on evidence of
a fraudulent motive.7 Following the Supreme Court decision
in Regal Castings Ltd v Lightbody,8 in which the Court ruled
that an intent to defraud creditors in the context of s 60 of the
Property Law Act 1952 did not require a fraudulent motive
or purpose, it has been held that a fraudulent motive is no
longer required for purposes of s 44 of the PRA.9 The
wording of s 60 being sufficiently similar to s 44, the courts
have accepted that knowledge that a disposition is likely to
hinder, delay or defeat a spouse or partner of their relation-
ship property entitlement is sufficient to establish intent.10
In regard to the children’s education trusts, the Courts
were unanimous that there was ample evidence of disposi-
tions being made to defeat Mrs Clayton’s rights under the
Act. The trusts were settled in 2004, after Vivienne Ullrich
QC gave advice that Mr Clayton’s business interests were
vulnerable to relationship property claims in the event of a
separation. The trusts acquired properties for which Mr Clayton
paid deposits and provided interest free loans. The VRPT
also provided some of the funding by means of interest free
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loans. As there was no evidence that any of these payments
were to be repaid, they were held to be dispositions for
purposes of s 44.11
The defeating intent was inferred from Mrs Clayton’s
exclusion from the wide ranging list of discretionary benefi-
ciaries, which included not only the children and their issue,
but also Mr Clayton, any of his relatives, any nominated
business associates, employees or consultants of any busi-
nesses associated with Mr Clayton, as well as companies,
trustsandcharitableorganisations.TheexclusionofMrsClayton
following the receipt of Ms Ullrich’s advice led to the irresist-
ible conclusion that defeating Mrs Clayton’s interests was
uppermost in Mr Clayton’s mind.12
Section 44(2) empowers the Court to order a recipient,
who received the property otherwise than in good faith and
for valuable consideration, either to transfer the property to
such person as the Court directs or to pay that person a sum
of money. To give effect to an order under s 44(2), the Court
may make “such further order as it thinks fit”.13 Rather than
set aside the offending dispositions, the Family Court held
that Mrs Clayton was entitled to half the equity of the
property held in the two trusts.14 The High Court and Court
of Appeal upheld this order.15 However, the analysis in
support of this order is lacking. The effect of the dispositions
on Mrs Clayton’s rights was not discussed.
For Mrs Clayton to succeed, the dispositions must have
the effect of defeating her rights under the Act. The effect is
determined at the end of the relationship on the basis of a
“but for” test.16 But for the dispositions into the children’s
trusts, would Mrs Clayton have been entitled to share equally
in the assets of the trusts? She probably would have been
entitled to share in the dispositions made by Mr Clayton
personally, because those dispositions were in all likelihood
relationship property. Her entitlement to share in the dispo-
sitions from the VRPT could be justified if the trust did not
exist, as the Family Court and the High Court concluded.17
Mr Clayton would then have been the owner of the assets
and, as they were acquired during the marriage, they would
have been relationship property. But the Court of Appeal
overruled the lower courts on the invalidity of the trust. The
VRPT was a genuine trust.18 The advances were legitimate
exercises of the trustee’s powers and discretions.19 Even if
they were not to be repaid, they were permissible distribu-
tions to discretionary beneficiaries of the VRPT.20 Although
the Court of Appeal held that Mr Clayton’s power to add and
remove beneficiaries was property, it clearly stated that did
notmeanthat the trustassetsbeneficiallybelongedtoMrClayton
or that they were relationship property.21 It is therefore
unclear what rights Mrs Clayton had to the advances and
thus the extent to which her rights under the Act were
defeated by the VRPT making advances to the children’s
trusts. The order vesting half the equity in the children’s
trusts in Mrs Clayton may therefore have exceeded her
entitlement under the Act.
In regard to the post-separation trusts, Mrs Clayton’s
claim was hampered by difficulties in obtaining relevant
information from Mr Clayton, despite orders requiring dis-
closure. She was unable to prove that the trusts had been
settled with property to which she had a claim under the Act.
Mrs Clayton invited the Court of Appeal to adopt the broader
approach to a claimant’s onus taken by the United Kingdom
Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd, where, in
claims for ancillary relief in matrimonial proceedings, the
court was prepared to draw inferences adverse to a party
who failed to make full disclosure of all relevant informa-
tion.22 The public interest considerations lying behind the
purpose and principles of the PRA required parties to make
full and frank disclosure of all relevant information to ensure
that the court was in a position to make appropriate orders
for the ascertainment and division of relationship property
under the PRA.23 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that
if a party who had relevant information failed to disclose it in
proceedings, the court could draw such inferences as it
considered appropriate, including the adverse inference that
the information would not have assisted that party if it had
been disclosed.24 Using that approach, the Court of Appeal
held that in the absence of evidence that property transferred
to two of the post-separation trusts was Mr Clayton’s sepa-
rate property, the inference could be drawn that if the rel-
evant information had been disclosed it would not have
supported his case that there was no jurisdiction to make
orders under s 44.
This ruling could be of considerable assistance to claim-
ants frustrated by their former partner’s lack of cooperation
in resolving relationship property questions “inexpensively,
simply and speedily”.25 However, as the Supreme Court
warned in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd, the special nature
of relationship property proceedings does not give the courts
licence to engage in pure speculation. 26
Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 182
The application under s 182 of the Family Proceedings
Act 1980 related to the Claymark Trust, which Mr Clayton
settled in 1994 to acquire two properties adjoining the
sawmill. Mr Clayton and two independent professionals
were the trustees. Mr and Mrs Clayton were both discretion-
ary beneficiaries and their children were the final beneficia-
ries.27 Mrs Clayton argued that the trust was a nuptial
settlement and that it should be varied to give effect to her
expectations of benefit from the trust. The High Court and
Court of Appeal upheld the Family Court finding that the
trust was not a nuptial settlement and that there was there-
fore no jurisdiction to make an order under s 182.28
For purposes of determining whether a settlement is nup-
tial in character, it is not enough that either or both spouses
are beneficiaries. The central issue is whether the spouses
expected the settlement to make provision for them by virtue
of their marriage. If that expectation is wholly or partially
defeated by the dissolution of their marriage, the settlement
can be varied under s 182 to give effect as far as possible to
the parties’ reasonable expectations of the settlement when it
was made.29 If the dissolution of the marriage does not affect
the applicant’s expectations of the settlement, there is no
reason for the Court to intervene.
Even though the Claymark Trust was settled during the
marriage, ostensibly for the benefit of the parties and their
children, Mr and Mrs Clayton had no expectation that it
would provide for them during their marriage. The trust was
settled for strategic business purposes to acquire two prop-
erties adjoining the sawmill to create a buffer between the
mill and its neighbours to reduce difficulties with obtaining
resource consent for operating hours of the mill. The trust
was not formed as a means by which Mrs Clayton would
acquire an interest or expectation in business assets.30 Fur-
thermore, having signed the s 21 agreement, Mrs Clayton
could not have reasonably expected to benefit from any of
the business assets. Although the agreement was eventually
set aside, the relevant expectations were those at the time the
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trust was settled. The dissolution of the parties’ marriage
therefore did not defeat their expectations.
Sham or illusory trust
The VRPT was the most valuable of the trusts settled by
Mr Clayton. It held the land and buildings from which the
businesses operated and acted as a banker by borrowing
from the Bank of New Zealand to make advances to other
trusts and entities. Mrs Clayton’s principal argument was
that this Trust was a sham.31
Mr Clayton established the VRPT by executing a declara-
tion of trust in 1999 to protect the land and buildings from
the risks associated with his business operations.32 He was
the sole trustee and a discretionary beneficiary, along with
his wife and their two children. The children were the final
beneficiaries.33 As Trustee, Mr Clayton had the power to
appoint any of the income and capital to any of the discre-
tionary beneficiaries.34 In his personal capacity as “Principal
Family Member” he held the power to appoint and remove
trustees, and the power to add and remove discretionary
beneficiaries.35 Unusually, perhaps, there was a clause per-
mitting a trustee who was also a beneficiary to exercise any
of the powers and discretions in favour of him or herself.36
Mr Clayton was thus entitled to appoint any of the capital
and income to himself.
The High Court held that the trust was not a sham.37
Mr Clayton genuinely intended to create a trust and he did so
for legitimate business purposes. The trust deed was not a
façade or pretence intended to conceal the true nature of the
transaction. However, the High Court agreed with the Fam-
ily Court that by virtue of the powers reserved to Mr Clayton
the trust was “illusory”.38
The Family Court relied on the trustees’ unfettered discre-
tion and power to act partially to conclude that the trustees
could not be held to account in the exercise of their powers.39
Furthermore, the deed included a power to revoke, vary and
amend the provisions relating to trust administration and
managementwhich, theFamilyCourtheld, allowedMrClayton
to revoke the trust and re-vest the trust assets in himself.40
The High Court did not agree that those powers rendered
the trust illusory. It pointed out that the revocation power in
the VRPT was limited to administration and management of
the trust, and did not give Mr Clayton the power to bring the
trust to an end.41 Instead the wide dispositive powers in
relation to income and capital, and the power to self-benefit
led the High Court to conclude that the trust was “illu-
sory”:42
Mr Clayton effectively retained all the powers of owner-
ship [and had the power] … to do whatever he wants with
trust property. … [He] is able to deal with trust property
just as he would if the trust had never been created.
The Court of Appeal also rejected the sham trust allegation.
The trust could not be a sham because the requisite “sham-
ming intention” was not present. In so holding, the Court
took the view that a sham trust depended on a specific
intention of pretence and deceit and not on the mere absence
of trust intention.43
The concept of an illusory trust as something distinct from
a sham was firmly rejected by the Court of Appeal. It referred
to the treatment of illusory trust in academic writings as a
trust that “looks like or appears to be a trust but has no real
substance or effect so that no trust was intended”.44 The
Court interpreted this to mean the same thing as sham
intention, saying:45
Both terms focus on the real or true intentions of the
settlor. The question in both cases is, notwithstanding the
existence of a trust deed, did the settlor genuinely intend
to create a valid, enforceable trust. In the absence of the
requisite genuine intention, there will be no trust at all. As
we have already noted, this question involves an exami-
nation of all the relevant evidence relating to the determi-
nation of the settlor’s real or true intentions. The inquiry
focuses not on the legal form of the otherwise valid trust
deed but on those intentions.
On application, the Court ruled that a valid discretionary
trust had been created.46 The VRPT met the three certainty
requirements for a trust: intention, subject matter and objects.
Mr Clayton’s wide powers as trustee to deal with the prop-
erty for his own benefit and without regard to the interests of
other beneficiaries did not eliminate his trust obligations to
the beneficiaries to act honestly and in good faith, and to
account for the trust property. Given the appearance of a
valid trust and no sham intention arising on the facts, the
trust could not be said to be an illusion.
In our opinion, however, there is an important distinction
between sham and illusory trust. A sham requires an active
intention to deceive — the sham is intended to look like a
trust but it is deliberately not intended ultimately to operate
as one. A sham allegation is justifiably a difficult one to prove
and successful cases are few.47 An illusory trust, on the other
hand, does not depend on an intention to deceive. Rather, an
analysis of the terms of the trust deed shows that actually no
trust was intended.
A settlor often wishes to create a trust but also wishes to
retain significant control over the trust property. A legitimate
balance between these two aims is sought using a variety of
clauses in the deed. On analysis of the powers and restric-
tions in a particular deed, it may become clear that a true
trust was in fact not intended after all. There was no inten-
tion that the trust be a pretence; there was simply a misun-
derstanding or lack of knowledge about what is required for
a trust to be a trust. The settlor may have genuinely thought
he was settling a trust, but if there was not an absolute and
effective alienation of property to the trustee for the benefit
of beneficiaries, he did not intend a trust after all.
Power as property
The rejection of the illusory trust concept did not conclude
consideration of Mrs Clayton’s claims against the VRPT. The
Court of Appeal invited counsel to present arguments on the
power to add and remove discretionary beneficiaries, and
ruled that this power was a “general power of appointment”
that amounted to property in the hands of Mr Clayton.48 The
power gave him “the unfettered right to remove the other
‘Discretionary Beneficiaries’ of the trust, including those
who were also the ‘Final Beneficiaries’, and to leave himself
as the sole beneficiary entitled to receive the income and
capital of the trust” during the existence of the trust and
under the power of appointment on vesting day.49 If Mr Clayton
exercised his power in this way, “he would become both the
legal and beneficial owner of the trust assets and there would
then be no trust at all”.50 Mr Clayton’s intention had been to
confer the power on himself in his personal capacity51 and, as
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such, neither the doctrine of fraud on a power nor any
fiduciary duties applied to restrict the exercise of the power
in his own favour and prevent it from being analysed as
property.52
Accordingly, the power was property that fell within the
pool of relationship property to which Mrs Clayton had a
claim. The value of the power was said to be the value of any
property that would be received in the event that the power
was exercised, namely the trust property.53
This ruling is troubling in several respects. First, while
Mr Clayton had the power to add and remove discretionary
beneficiaries, he did not have the power to remove final
beneficiaries. He could remove final beneficiaries only in
their capacity as discretionary beneficiaries. The Court was
therefore wrong to say, repeatedly, that Mr Clayton could
exercise this power to become the “sole beneficiary” of the
trust. There would always be final beneficiaries to whom he
wouldcontinuetoowefiduciaryduties. Incontrast toMrClayton
himself, who was merely a discretionary beneficiary, the final
beneficiaries had a contingent interest in the trust property
against which advances could be made under s 41 of the
Trustee Act 1956.
Second, the Court of Appeal likened the power to add and
remove beneficiaries to the power to revoke a trust. It drew
support from the Privy Council decision in Tasarruf Mevduati
Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank & Trust Co (Cayman)
Ltd.54 There, a power of revocation was recognised as a
property right because it was a “completely”55 or “truly”56
general power. It was capable of vesting in the Official
Assignee on bankruptcy because it enabled the holder of the
power to re-vest the subject-matter of the power, the trust
property, in himself. While this decision undoubtedly expands
the notion that powers can be property in certain circum-
stances, the power to revoke differs significantly from the
power to add and remove beneficiaries. The purpose of a
broad power of revocation is to enable the settlor to retract
the trust at any time without any limitation on the exercise of
the power. Indeed, it could be argued that where such a
power has been conferred, it is questionable whether there
can be a trust at all. Besides, Mr Clayton’s power to add and
remove beneficiaries could not be used to bring the trust to
an end, because he could not remove the final beneficiaries.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s ruling, he could not have
effectively revoked the trust by means of this power.57
Third, we are not persuaded that the power was property
in the hands of Mr Clayton simply because the power was
vested in him in his personal capacity. The capacity in which
a power of appointment is held is not determinative. For
example, the power to appoint and remove trustees is gener-
ally held to be fiduciary in nature, even when someone holds
it in their personal capacity.58 The significance that the Court
of Appeal attaches to the capacity in which the power is held
is therefore misplaced in our view.
Rather, it is the nature of the power that should determine
whether it is fiduciary or not. If the power can be exercised in
a manner that could adversely affect beneficial interests, it
ought to be constrained by a fiduciary obligation to ensure
that it is exercised with those interests in mind. Allowing a
settlor to construct a trust that enables him or her to reorganise
the distribution of the property or change the beneficiaries
after the trust is settled risks undermining the institution of
the trust. For that reason, the power should be fettered so
that any exercise of it will give effect to the trust.59 The
power must not be exercised in bad faith; capriciously or
irrationally; outside of the scope or proper purpose of the
power (known as fraud on a power); or otherwise in breach
of fiduciary duty.
Fourth, the Court did not explain why the power was
relationship property. It held that the power came within the
extended definition of “property” in the PRA, which includes
“any other right or interest”.60 Mr Clayton’s power was a
“right” that created an “interest”, which was property and
hence “relationship property” under the Act when the par-
ties separated.61 Even if the power was property, that did not
automatically mean it was relationship property. No reason
was given for this classification. The classification of the
power as relationship property cannot be made by reference
to the assets in the trust, because they were not relationship
property. It would be a contradiction to the Court’s ruling
that gifts from the VRPT to the Claymark Trust were not
dispositions of relationship property.62 The alternative is
that the power was relationship property because it was
acquired during the marriage. Property acquired by either
party during the marriage is relationship property under
s 8(1)(e) of the PRA. But that approach runs the risk of
treating a power as property even where the trust was settled
with separate property. It would give the successful applicant
greater rights than he or she would have had under the Act. It
could even mean that strangers holding the power to add and
remove beneficiaries might find the power included in their
own relationship property proceedings, even though none of
the assets held in trust were contributed by the stranger and
there was no expectation that the stranger would exercise the
power to remove all the other beneficiaries and appoint only
him or herself! The classification of this power as relation-
ship property is thus not without difficulty and is already
giving rise to problems in other relationship property cases.63
Our fifth objection relates to the valuation of the power.
The Court ruled in Clayton that the value of a power such as
this will be the value of the property received in the event that
the power is exercised.64 There are at least two problems
with this. First, the assumption is being made that the power
will indeed be exercised in the donee’s favour and without
any appointments of trust property being made to other
beneficiaries.65 A future possibility is being valued as a
certainty.66 Second, when a power to remove beneficiaries is
exercised, it does not automatically have the effect of enti-
tling the remaining beneficiary to receive the property. That
will depend upon the terms of the trust deed. In Mr Clayton’s
case, this analysis held true only because he was also the sole
trustee and could exercise the power to appoint all the trust
property to himself. Yet, the Court’s comments on valuation
do not indicate that Mr Clayton’s role as sole trustee or his
power to appoint property, or his power to self-benefit were
crucial for the power to add and remove beneficiaries to have
any real value. It is not obvious that the power to add and
remove beneficiaries should necessarily be valued at the net
value of the trust assets.
Powers and duties
While the Court focused on the power to add and remove
beneficiaries, it actually relied on a combination of powers.
The power to remove other discretionary beneficiaries could
not alone have given Mr Clayton access to the trust property.
His power to appoint income and capital, and his power to
self-benefit were crucial to this outcome, as was the exclusion
of the duty to act impartially and consider all beneficiaries.67
Indeed it could even be said that Mr Clayton did not need the
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power to add and remove beneficiaries to gain access to the
trust property. It was, in a sense, a red herring. The only
means by which Mr Clayton could access the trust property
was through his power to appoint income and capital to
himself. But he held this power as a trustee and hence was
subject to fiduciary duties in the exercise of the power. He
was not free and that power was therefore not property
either.
The only way in which the Court could have legitimately
concluded that the trust property beneficially belonged to
Mr Clayton was by finding that no trust was really intended.
One could say that because the powers Mr Clayton conferred
upon himself were so wide-ranging, he was the sole trustee
and important fiduciary duties were excluded, arguably there
was little evidence of any meaningful accountability. Such
accountability is central to the existence of a trust and might
suggest a lack of trust intention. The reality of how the trust
was structured and what the various powers conferred on
Mr Clayton allowed him to do were all but ignored for the
purpose of identifying trust intention. The difficulty arises
because the Court’s approach to establishing trust intention
is rather formalistic and narrow.
Interestingly, the Court did note equity’s preference for
substance over form but only in relation to ascertaining a
sham intention.68 The substance here did not go so far as to
amount to a sham because there was no intention to disguise
or conceal an alternative true intention. It appears that two
very different approaches are being taken to establishing
intention. Where the enquiry concerns trust intention, the
Court is satisfied with a fairly formulaic analysis. When the
enquiry moves to sham intention, it changes to take account
of substance and conduct. In our view, the inquiry as to
substance should apply to both trust intention and sham
intention. In doing so, it becomes clear that there is room for
the illusory trust notion. Where the substance of a trust was
not really intended but there is no suggestion that the settlor
was acting fraudulently, the result is neither a valid trust nor
a sham trust, but rather no trust for want of intention. If
Mr Clayton had the power to remove discretionary and final
beneficiaries, as the Court of Appeal seemed to suggest he
did, as well as his powers as sole trustee to appoint all the
income and capital to himself without having the duty to act
impartially or consider all beneficiaries, then his intention to
create a trust would surely be in doubt. However, trust deeds
with such terms are likely to be uncommon.
Conclusion
When Parliament adopted the Property (Relationships) Amend-
ment Act in 2001 it decided against giving the courts the
power to make orders against the trust capital to give effect
to relationship property entitlements. Trusts were “created
for legitimate reasons and so should be permitted to fulfil
that purpose”.69 Parliament made this decision knowing that
trusts were undermining the social aims of the PRA.70 Yet, it
chose to protect trusts against relationship property claims.
Since then a string of cases has, in effect, challenged that
legislative policy by pursuing alternative arguments to access
trust property. Most of these arguments have failed on trust
law principles. Clayton is another example of such a chal-
lenge. But in this case the Court of Appeal has singled out the
power to add and remove beneficiaries and held it to be
property because Mr Clayton held it in his personal capacity,
not as trustee. In this article we have explained why we
believe that decision is wrong. If a trust was intended, as the
Court of Appeal found, then the powers must be constrained
so that the trust can be given effect and not easily under-
mined. Even if the power were not so constrained, its exercise
would not have given Mr Clayton access to the property.
The Court of Appeal’s decision comes in the wake of the
Law Commission Report, Review of the Law of Trusts: A
Trusts Act for New Zealand, which identified the effect of
trusts on the relationship property regime as particularly
problematic.71 It recommended review of the Act and, in the
meantime, amendments to s 44C of the PRA and s 182 of the
Family Proceedings Act.72
Parliament might have been right to tread cautiously in
2001 in relation to trusts. But in light of the mounting
judicial challenges and the Law Commission’s concerns, that
policy decision may now have to be reviewed. The appropri-
ate body to do that is Parliament where all the competing
interests can be debated.
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